

Message Text

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ACTION SCI-06

INFO OCT-01 ARA-16 EUR-25 NEA-14 IO-14 ISO-00 ACDA-19

AF-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-11 PM-07 H-03 INR-11 L-03

NASA-04 NSAE-00 NSC-07 OIC-04 SP-03 PA-04 PRS-01

RSC-01 SS-20 USIA-15 SAJ-01 FEAE-00 DRC-01 /201 W

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P R 301523Z AUG 74

FM USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4992

INFO AEC GERMANTOWN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

USMISSION GENEVA

AMEMBASSY LIMA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO

C O N F I D E N T I A L IAEA VIENNA 7583

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM TECH IAEA AR CA

SUBJECT: ARGENTINE SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH IAEA

REF: IAEA VIENNA 7536

1. IT APPEARS THAT CANADIANS HAVE DECIDED ON THEIR OWN TO TAKE POSITIVE ACTION RE ARGENTIAN RIO TERCERO SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT. FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS GIVE TO MISSION TODAY BY HAMMOND (CANADA), WHO ATTENDING NPT PREPCOM SESSION IN GENEVA.

2. OTTAWA HAS INSTRUCTED ITS PARIS EMBASSY TO TALK
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TO FRENCH. APPROACH WILL BE FIRST TO TEST FRENCH GENERAL

POLICY AS A NUCLEAR EXPORTER WITH RESPECT TO SAFEGUARDS REQUIRED. IF RESPONSE IS AMBIGUOUS, CANADIANS WILL THEN DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC CASE OF ARGENTINA. HAMMOND ADMITS THAT BEST COMMITMENT THEY WOULD HOPE TO GET WOULD BE ASSURANCE THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN BOARD OF GOVERNORS DEBATE ON GOV 1621 CONCEPTS AS THEY RELATE TO RIO TERCERO AGREEMENT. HAMMOND THINKS THIS MIGHT OBTAIN NEED FOR HURST TO STOP OVER IN PARIS WHILE NOT RULING OUT THAT SUBSEQUENT EVNETS MIGHT STILL REQUIRE IT.

3. OTTAWA HAS INSTRUCTED ITS EMBASSY BUENOS AIRES TRY TO SECURE IMMEDIATE GOA ACCEPTANCE OF CANADA-ARGENTINA BILATERAL COOPERATION AGREEMENT WHICH INCLUDES SPECIFIC CLAUSES WITH RESPECT TO PROHIBITION AGAINST ANY EXPLOSIVE USE, AS WELL AS SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT FOR SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT WITH DURATION AND TERMINATION CLAUSE IN ACCORD WITH GOV 1621. ON ASSUMPTION THAT GOA WILL NOT AGREE, CANADIANS WILL THEN ASK FOR EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH GOA PRIOR TO SEPT 13 ON SUBJECT OF PROHIBITION AGAINST USE OF CANADIAN SUPPLIED ASSISTANCE FOR PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE DEVICES. CANADIANS WILL INFORM GOA UNDER INSTRUCTIONS THAT CANADA FIRMLY COMMITTED TO GOV 1621 CONCEPTS FOR INCLUSION IN RIO TERCERO SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENT AND THAT CANADA WILL SO STATE FOR THE RECORD AT THE SEPT 13 BOARD MEETING. THEY WILL SUGGEST THAT THEY FEEL SURE THAT OTHER POTENTIAL NUCLEAR SUPPLYING STATES WILL SIMILARLY SUPPORT GOV 1621 CONCEPTS.

4. CANADIANS APPEAR TO HAVE GONE AS FAR AS THEY CAN WITHOUT A SPECIFIC CABINET DECISION. HAMMOND URGED THAT ALL SUPPLIER STATES BE AUTHORIZED TO INFORM CANADIANS IN ADVANCE OF BOARD MEETING ON SPECIFIC STATEMENTS THEY WILL MAKE AT BOARD IF REQUIRED TO SPEAK ON ARGENTINE AGREEMENT. STATEMENT SHOULD INCLUDE INDICATION OF GENERAL SUPPORT FOR 1621 CONCEPTS AND AN INDICATION THAT COUNTRY CONCERNED WOULD IN THE FUTURE REQUIRE INCLUSION OF THOSE CONCEPTS IN SAFEGUARDS AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD COVER THEIR EXPORTS OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OR EQUIPMENT TO A NON-

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATE NOT PARTY TO NPT.

5. THIS WOULD PROVIDE CANADIANS WITH FURTHER ARGUMENTS TO USE WITH IRAOLAGOITIA IN VIENNA. HAMMOND IS NOT OVERLY SANGUINE IRAOLAGOITIA WILL HAVE MUCH FLEXIBILITY IN DEVIATING FROM THE RIGID INSTRUCTIONS WHICH HE WILL OBVIOUSLY BRING WITH HIM. THEY DO HOPE HOWEVER THAT HE MIGHT, AS A MINIMUM, BE CONVINCED NOT

TO PLACE THE ISSUE BEFORE THE BOARD. CANADIANS FEEL THAT ARGENTINE ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT IS NOT WRITING ITS OWN INSTRUCTIONS AND IRAOLAGOITIA MIGHT CONCEIVABLY BE PERSUADED TO PRESENT THE FACTS OF LIFE TO BUENOS AIRES AND IN TIME ACHIEVE A GREATER MEASURE OF FLEXIBILTYY. CANADIANS ARE WORRIED, OF COURSE, THAT ARGENITNA MAY DEVELOP A PERSECUTION COMPLEX WHEN PRESENTED WITH A UNITED FRONT OF SUPPLIER COUNTRIES. THEY HOPE THIS CAN SOMEHOW BE AVOIDED BUT ARE OBVIOUSLY READY TO TAKE THE CONDEQUENCES IF IT CANNOT.

6. WE ASSUME US WILL HAVE NO PROBLEM IN MAKING THE STATEMENT WHICH CANADA REQUESTS SINCE THIS AGREES FULLY WITH OUR LONG TERM CONSISTENT POSITION ON MATTER. PORTER

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